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‘As A Scab’: Rank and File Workers, Strikebreakers, and 
the End of the 1951 Waterfront Lock-Out 
On 9 July 1951, the unions involved in the waterfront lock-out and the lock-out’s supporting 
strikes met and passed a return to work motion: ‘Supremely confident of the conscious 
discipline of our ranks we call upon every individual member to return to work and hold up 
the banner of his union on the job.’1 The wording of the motion implied a top-down decision, 
and suggested that the rank and file were waiting for the call to return to work, an assumption 
that historians have not challenged. This article presents a different view of the end of the 
dispute, and explores the assessments that workers made about continuing the dispute, to 
demonstrate that they did not blindly followed those in leadership positions.  Strikebreakers 
were central to the decisions workers made to continue the dispute; outside strikebreakers 
presented a risk to existing workers job – and the threat of never working on the wharf again 
made the costs of the dispute untenable for many. Despite their importance, strikebreakers 
have been under-researched, and this article suggests new ways of understanding the 
decisions made both by strikebreakers and by those who remained on strike or locked-out 
until 9 July. To understand the end of the 1951 waterfront dispute, it is not enough to 
examine the actions of union and political leaders like Jock Barnes, President of the New 
Zealand Waterfront Workers Union, and Prime Minister Sidney Holland. 
Most historical accounts of the 1951 waterfront lock-out and supporting strikes have 
focused on the leaders rather than the rank and file, and the origins of the dispute, rather than 
its conclusion. In Confrontation ’51, Michael Bassett argued that the dispute was driven by 
political power and the leaders’ personalities.2 Although Bassett’s view has been challenged, 
his ideas have been treated as the orthodox view of the dispute, particularly in general 
histories of New Zealand.
3
 Bassett’s focus on leadership has been replicated in projects that 
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disagree with other aspects of his interpretation. The Big Blue had its origins in a Trade 
Union History Project seminar and its 22 contributions deepened the discussion of the lock-
out; however, many of the pieces collected in the volume are narratives told from the 
perspective of individuals in leadership positions, either during the dispute itself or 
subsequently.
4
 Anna Green’s British Capital, Antipodean Labour provided the most sustained 
alternative understanding of the dispute to Bassett; she argued that the dispute, and conflict 
on the wharf, grew out of the nature of waterfront work, rather than the individuals involved.
5
 
Green, along with several other historians, have examined the decades leading up to 1951, to 
put the dispute in context, but few discuss the aftermath, which contributes to the skewed 
picture of the finale as inevitable but uninteresting.
6
 The key question historians have asked 
about the end of the lock-out has been about strategy: could different union leadership have 
avoided the defeat through less militant tactics?
7
 Even Green focused on leadership, rather 
than rank and file in her brief discussion of the end of the dispute.
8
 The focus on strategy 
suggests a chess-board, a controlled environment where leaders were able to dictate decisions 
to the pawns they controlled. However, concentrating historical attention on workers’ 
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decisions in the last month of the dispute demonstrates that the dispute was not a game that 
anyone controlled, and the actions of pawns were as important as the actions of any other 
piece.  
The origins of the 1951 waterfront lock-out have been covered elsewhere, and so a brief 
summary will suffice here. The immediate post-war period was a time of repeated and intense 
conflict on the waterfront; in the lead-up to 1951, industrial conflict on the waterfront was 
triggered by disagreements over the payment of dirt money, the union’s safety concerns, 
wages and, as Green points out, the struggle for control.
9
 The waterfront dispute began in 
February 1951 as a disagreement over wages, but quickly escalated into a major conflict: the 
waterside workers refused to work overtime and the shipping companies responded by 
locking the workers out. The Holland National government took control of the lock-out and 
committed itself to dismantling the New Zealand Waterside Workers’ Union; cabinet granted 
itself extraordinary powers through emergency regulations that limited freedom of speech 
and criminalised the provision of money or food to waterside workers. The draconian nature 
of these regulations brought coal-miners, freezing workers and seamen out on strike in 
support of the locked-out waterside workers. The government had to find labour to replace 
8000 watersiders if Holland was going to claim victory and the economy was going to 
continue to function. From 27 February 1951, the armed forces worked the waterfront, which 
alleviated the government’s immediate problem of loading and unloading ships (although 
there were still delays) and bought them time to persuade watersiders to return to work on 
their terms, or to recruit a new workforce.
10
  
Three medium sized branches of the New Zealand Waterside Workers’ Union, New 
Plymouth, Timaru and Port Chalmers, voted to return to work before July 1951. These 
branches give a sense of the sort of decisions workers were making. The Timaru branch had a 
history of conflict with the national union, which appears to explain those workers decision to 
return to work.
11
 When the New Plymouth branch voted to return to work, Jock Barnes 
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dismissed it as a bad port, but unlike Timaru there is no evidence of a history of conflict with 
the national office.
12
 Norman Quinlan, a New Plymouth watersider, described the secretary of 
the New Plymouth union, Jack Harris, travelling down to Wellington to explain to the 
national office that the New Plymouth branch was desperate and needed financial assistance. 
Harris returned with a message that the national office could not provide any assistance. 
Quinlan linked the decision to return to work with the lack of aid. In 151 Days, Dick Scott 
offered a different explanation; after describing strikebreakers beginning work Scott stated: 
“The strikebreakers slowly grew in numbers and the following week the branch cracked.”13 
Scott suggested that strikebreakers were the catalyst to return to work as watersiders feared 
for their jobs. The Department of Labour figures support Scott’s argument; on 26 April, 126 
strikebreakers had registered to work in New Plymouth. A third of these had previously been 
members of the NZWWU, two-thirds had not, the highest percentage of outside workers at 
any port.
14
 The 82 workers who were not members of the union were a threat to the jobs of 
NZWWU members. New Plymouth workers watching other men do their jobs faced the 
possibility of never returning to the wharf. This does not mean that Norman Quinlan was 
misrepresenting the decision when he emotionally described the role hardship played in the 
decision to return to work in New Plymouth, but that faced with the possibility of losing their 
jobs permanently, their hardship became much more difficult to withstand. New Plymouth 
workers based their decisions not just on short-term hardship, but on the long-term threat to 
their ability to work on the wharf. On 8 June, Port Chalmers watersiders voted to return to 
work as a branch.
15
 By the end of May, Port Chalmers was one of the few ports where no 
new union had been formed. In early June, there were moves to register a new union. Such an 
organisation would threaten the jobs of NZWWU members in a one-industry town.
16
 Neil 
Crichton, the president of the Port Chalmers branch, stated publicly that it was hardship, and 
the threat of strikebreakers that drove watersiders back.
17
 In Port Chalmers, the return to work 
in June was partly driven by short-term economic hardship, but it was also driven by the 
                                                 
 
12
 Minutes of Meeting of Unions Directly Involved in Waterfront Dispute, 13 June 1951, Box 1, Vault 156, 
Barnes Papers, Auckland University Library (AUL). 
13
 Scott, 151 Days, p.103. 
14
 Strike Returns, 26 April 1951, AANK W 328513 3/5/398, ANZ (Archives New Zealand). 
15
 Hotere, p.78. 
16
 ibid., p.81. 
17
 ibid., p.79. 
5 
threat of strikebreakers, the same factors that had led New Plymouth workers back to the 
wharf.  
Very few union members ended up working as strikebreakers; even at the beginning of 
July only 610 men had registered to work on the wharf from branches that had remained 
out.
18
 A far more common way that individuals withdrew from the dispute was to get work in 
another industry. This would not get them named ‘scab’, but was also not treated as a 
legitimate survival strategy. In Auckland, those who sought to do outside work had to apply 
to the executive for permission, and in the early months permission was only granted in 
exceptional circumstances.
19
 As the chair of the Auckland branch told a union member who 
travelled to Taupō to start a business: ‘he left the Union during a critical time and if every 
man did this there would be no union’.20 Or, as a watersider’s child understood it: ‘I got the 
impression that if you took other work, you were a scab.’21 Supporting strikers, the press and 
the government also saw the taking of other work as a sign of watersiders’ weakness.22 The 
cumulative effect of locked-out workers taking work in other industries can be seen in 
Auckland. On 29 May 1951, the new union in Auckland had 1,400 members, and the 
executive decided to close its membership.
23
 Once this occurred, substantial numbers of 
Auckland watersiders withdrew from the dispute and sought work in other industries as they 
believed they would not be able to return to work on the wharf. In the first three months of 
the lockout, just ten men applied for clearance (permission to get other work from the branch), 
in early June there were five applications for clearance a week, and in the last week of June 
there were over twenty.
24
 Some applications addressed this directly; one watersider wrote: 
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“the way I figure things I’d never get a job back on the wharf so I think I’d better get my 
clearance and try and get another job to replenish my swag again.”25 Many more Auckland 
members found other work without getting formal clearance. On 11 June, the police 
estimated that 250 members, more than ten per cent, had left the union in Auckland, with or 
without clearances.
26
 The police do not appear to have been exaggerating. On June 23, the 
relief committee revealed that two hundred members had stopped collecting relief over the 
previous fortnight.
27
 After four months, the only reason a watersider would stop collecting 
relief would be if he had found other work. The dramatic increase in Auckland watersiders 
who applied for clearance or took other work without clearance in June demonstrated that 
workers were making their own assessment of the costs of continuing the dispute. Once 
Auckland watersiders realised that they would not work on the wharf again, many decided 
they could not remain part of the lockout.  
In the first week of July, a cascade of local decisions at ports and mines made the 
continuation of the dispute untenable. At a meeting in mid-June, miners’ representatives had 
expressed how difficult their position was.
28
 Striking coal-miners articulated the same 
questions as watersiders when deciding how long they could remain out: what was the cost of 
remaining out and was that cost worth the risk? The two main mining areas were Huntly and 
the West Coast.  On the West Coast there were no strikebreakers, either on the waterfront or 
in the mines; over five months just eight men registered an interest in working on the wharf 
with the Department of Labour, which was insufficient to start working the wharf with 
civilian labour.
29
  In Huntly, there were strikebreakers, but they were only working in open-
cast mines.  However, armed forces were working in both areas, and their strikebreaking 
labour created more of a threat to the coal-miners than it did to the watersiders.  As the coal-
miners were on a supporting strike, rather than fighting their own battle, the defence forces 
only needed to provide enough coal for the duration of the lock-out to nullify the coal-miners’ 
support for the watersiders. The representatives of the Westport branch of the Watersiders 
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Union made the relationship between cost and risk clear: ‘We felt that the Army could 
produce sufficient opencast coal to defeat the ends of the strike. Very little relief had been 
forthcoming and the going was tough.’30 On 26 and 27 June, miners in eight mines in the 
Buller district returned to work.
31
 Thirteen days earlier their representatives had said that the 
Buller Central committee “would have difficulty in holding the position for more than a 
week.”32 Other mines followed; between Tuesday 3 July and Friday 6 July miners at all 
mines but one returned to work.
33
 Miners at Ohura returned to work the following week on 
Monday 9 July.
34
 At a joint union meeting in Auckland on 5 July, Mr Baxter said: “they have 
found it very difficult to hold their members owing to the economic situation […] the miners 
could see no hope of a settlement. If there was any hope they would have held out.”35 Miners 
explained their decision to return to work by emphasising the difficult position they were in, 
but just as importantly – they had come to believe that the NZWWU could not win. 
By the beginning of July, in Auckland, the number of watersiders who were seeking 
other work made the dispute unsustainable for the branch as a whole. When the executive met 
on Tuesday 3 July, the day after the miners returned to work, the executive granted fourteen 
requests for clearance, and declined six.
36
 They were concerned about the effect this number 
of releases would have on the morale of other members and decided not tell the applicants 
straight away, but to wait until after the members’ meeting the next day.37 At the same 
meeting, the executive passed a motion that demonstrated they did not believe the dispute 
could continue: “That national office be advised of the true situation of the Auckland 
branch.”38 At a members’ meeting the following day, Wednesday 4 July, Alex Drennan spoke 
about clearances: 
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Mr Drennan drew the members attention to the fact that at every meeting 
resolutions were moved to stand firm with the National organisation and these 
resolutions were carried unanimously but immediately after these meetings some 
of the members were applying for releases. Although he considered it was better 
for them to apply for release than to walk away from the union he was of the 
opinion that if they were unable to carry on the struggle any longer they should 
intimate that to members.
39
  
 
The members’ meeting then passed an even more urgent motion: “that this branch considers 
the National Strike Committee should be called together immediately to reconsider policy in 
the light of the deterioration in the situation”.40 The number of members who had taken other 
work gave the Auckland branch no choice but to seek an end to the dispute.  
Lyttelton workers voted to return to work on Wednesday 4 July. The number of 
strikebreakers in Lyttelton had increased throughout June, and a substantial number of 
Lyttelton workers had wanted to return to work for some time.
41
 On Thursday 5 July, the 
branch met again, and reversed the decision of the previous day, but it was too late. The 
number of locked-out watersiders who had registered that they wished to work on the wharf 
increased from 37 on 4 July to 190 and then 286 over the next two days.
42
 The waterside 
workers who had taken work on the Lyttelton waterfront in the first week of July increased 
the number of workers registered with the new union to 700.
 43
 There had been 800 waterside 
workers in Lyttelton before the dispute; the 500 workers who remained out in Lyttelton knew 
that not everyone would be able to return to work when there were only 100 jobs remaining.
44
  
Most discussions of the end of the 1951 waterfront dispute have focused on the actions 
of Jock Barnes and assumed that workers relied on the decision of the leadership. An 
Auckland branch leader told Green: ‘some of us made an attempt to pull back on this thing, 
but there were individuals in the leadership that were able to convince the workers that they 
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were winning when they were losing’.45 However, the examination of what happened in New 
Plymouth, Port Chalmers, Auckland, Lyttelton and in coal mining areas demonstrate that 
workers were making their own decisions – and evaluating the likelihood of winning, and 
that the presence of outside strikebreakers was critical to their decisions. Throughout the 
dispute, strikebreakers begat strikebreakers; the more strikebreakers there were working on 
the wharf the more likely former workers were to go back. The number of former watersiders 
registered with the Department of Labour in Dunedin leapt from just seven on 8 June to 61 on 
11 June after the nearby Port Chalmers branch went back to work as a branch.
46
 The ports 
where significant numbers of watersiders went back to work as individuals, such as Bluff and 
Nelson, had a high level of strikebreakers registered from early on in the dispute.
47
 Fewer 
strikebreakers also meant a stronger branch. At the beginning of the lock-out there were 2200 
workers on the Wellington wharf and the Department of Labour struggled to get 
strikebreakers in the area.
48
 Although the number of members of the new union steadily 
increased from 66 at the end of May to 409 by 12 July, this was less than a fifth of the size of 
the previous workforce, and therefore those who were locked-out could believe that they 
were going to be able to return to their jobs.
49
 After the dispute ended, almost everyone who 
wished to return to work on the wharf in Wellington was able to do so, including union 
militants.
50
 In Wellington, because there were proportionally fewer strikebreakers, there was 
neither an exodus to other work, nor a last minute rush to get back to limited places. One of 
the assumptions of most analysis of the 1951 waterfront dispute has been that the workers’ 
defeat was inevitable; watersiders could not win when they were fighting the full power of 
the state.
51
 The availability of strikebreakers has been taken for granted in the historical 
discussion. For example, Dick Scott stated that he believed government had too many 
advantages for the watersiders to overcome, listing economic and industrial factors, but he 
does not mention strikebreakers.
52
 Holland’s government could not win alone, or even with 
the help of the Federation of Labour. It needed replacement labour to move sugar off ships 
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and lamb carcasses on.
53
 The availability of this labour could not be taken for granted, as on 
the West Coast there were no strikebreakers, and in Wellington there were not enough to pose 
a threat to the existing union. To suggest Holland’s victory was inevitable is to ignore the 
importance of strikebreaking labour. 
 
Despite the vital role they played in bringing about the end of the 1951 waterfront dispute, 
strikebreakers have received little attention from historians. The lack of historical attention to 
strikebreakers is not unique to this industrial dispute, or newly discovered.
54
 As William 
Tuttle, a US labour historian, observed in 1966: ‘Despite their obvious significance in labor 
history, little is known about strikebreakers: who they were; their motives in signing on for 
such employment. Strikebreakers are anonymities; yet in order to understand labor history, 
especially during its turbulent phases, much needs to be known about them’.55 While 
historians have gone some way to respond to Tuttle’s challenge, their focus has been on the 
ways that strikebreakers were different from the workers they replaced. Alun Burge’s study 
of scabbing in interwar Wales paints a picture of the strikebreaker as an individual whose 
actions place him beyond the pale.
56
 The most extended discussion on any aspect of 
strikebreaking is from the United States, where historians have explored the image and the 
reality of African-American strikebreakers. Historians have come at this idea from different 
angles: in the 1970s Mark Stern sympathetically examined the perspective of African-
American strikebreakers, while Jerrell Shofner challenged the idea of African-American 
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strikebreakers by examining an African-American strike broken by white workers.
57
 More 
recent work has explored the portrayal of race and strikebreaking in the movie Matewan and 
the role of convict labour.
58
 The discussion of African-American strikebreakers in the US is 
one example of a wider literature that discusses strikebreaking in terms of ethnicity and 
difference, particularly immigration.
59
  Most of this work in some way explores the idea that 
immigrants are more likely to work as strikebreakers, although John Chalcraft recently added 
to this debate by arguing that migration can increase political and industrial unrest.
60
 The 
predominant historical approach to strikebreakers has been to explore them as outsiders.
61
 
The role of ethnicity in strikebreaking seems a promising place to start an examination 
of strikebreakers during the 1951 waterfront dispute, as there is some evidence of a 
significant number of Māori strikebreakers.62 On the Auckland wharf, which had employed 
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about 75 Māori workers before the lock-out, there were 400-600 Māori strikebreakers.63 In 
Gisborne, although there is no record of the ethnicity of the pre-lock-out workforce, the 
majority of strikebreakers were also Māori.64 On closer examination, however, the evidence 
about Māori strikebreakers demonstrates the limits of focusing on the differences between 
strikebreakers and the existing workforce. In Auckland and Gisborne, government, press and 
union sources independently described the number of Māori strikebreakers, and in doing so 
marked and drew attention to Māori.65 In other ports, the same sources remain silent about 
the ethnicity of strikebreakers, which strongly implies that the majority of strikebreakers were 
Pākehā.66 As sources emphasise the outsider status of strikebreakers, strikebreaking outsiders 
have received historical attention that was disproportionate to their presence.   
To go beyond existing historiographical approaches to strikebreakers as outsiders, it is 
important to understand the limitation of the sources on strikebreakers. The existence of 
strikebreakers is often well-documented.  In 1951, the Department of Labour carefully 
assembled tables keeping track of how many people were working in each port and unions 
went to great lengths to create accurate scab-lists.
67
 Despite this, any further information 
about strikebreakers beyond their existence is very difficult to access.  The Department of 
Labour was interested in numbers not in names, identifies or any other information.  Union 
scab-lists just include the surname and the initial of strike-breaking workers; the name D. 
Ashley or F. H. Adams by themselves provide little information about who these men were or 
why they made the decisions they did.
68
 In contrast with the effort that others put into 
documenting strikebreakers, strikebreakers have not wanted to be remembered as such by 
those around them. The starkest evidence of this is the UK 1985/6 miners’ strike, by the end 
of which the majority of miners had gone back to work as strikebreakers. This strike was 
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exceptionally well documented. Academics, journalists and lay people recorded the 
experiences of those involved as a political act and therefore there is a literature, far larger 
than in any other industrial dispute that documents the memories of strikers and their 
families.
69
 Even though hundreds of people have had extracts of their stories published, and 
strikebreaking was a majority experience, there is only one account of a strikebreaker.
 70
 
Moreover, that account begins with a long narration about why the strikebreaker does not 
want to be recorded. The same silence exists in oral history interviews about 1951, where a 
substantial body of oral histories have been recorded and many of those actively involved 
with the unions have been interviewed multiple times.
71
 Again, there is only one interview 
with a strikebreaker, and it only mentions working on the wharf in passing.
72
 Writing about 
strikebreakers is challenging for historians, because strikebreakers have tended to try and 
erase any record or memory of that work. As Alan Burge wrote: ‘Historians have paid little 
attention to scabs. Nor have scabs been anxious to promote their cause.’73 
Oral histories record a similar dynamic of those involved in the dispute actively 
remembering strikebreakers, and the invisibility of strikebreaking experiences. Hester 
Barron’s discussion of memory and the 1926 miners’ lock-out in Durham provides a useful 
starting point for an analysis of memories of 1951.
74
 Engaging with recent historiographical 
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debates on individual and collective memory, Barron demonstrated the work that mining 
communities put into maintaining a collective memory of 1926 based on solidarity. 
Memories of solidarity involved both heroic narratives of those involved in the lock-out and 
‘remorseless demonization’ of those who had worked as strikebreakers.75 However, she 
pointed out that despite the similarities of narratives of solidarity, there were also significant 
variations in narratives about the 1926 miners’ lock-out. She argued that individual’s 
accounts relate to the collective memory of mining communities, but that narrators also have 
to make sense of their memories in terms of their own life story.
76
 Discussion of 
strikebreakers in oral histories often reflected the union-based collective narrative about 
strikebreakers, which is available from archival sources, both in vilifying strikebreakers, and 
in emphasising the importance of remembering them.
77
 Oral history narratives that discuss 
strikebreakers tend to emphasise conflict, but they also demonstrate that strikebreaking and 
locked-out workers lived on the same streets and used the same institutions.  This is 
consistent with research into the 1912 Waihī strike, where mapping of strikers and 
strikebreakers has shown that they lived side-by-side.
78
 Johnny Mitchell described a fight 
with his strikebreaking neighbour in Freeman’s Bay; Gwendolene Pawson talked about 
physical fights with the children of strikebreakers at her Napier Catholic school; Kevin Ford 
recalled ‘getting a hiding’ from his father if he played with the neighbouring son of a 
strikebreaker.
79
 In addition some children remember how their father’s remained hostile to 
strikebreakers for decades. Maureen Fairey said: ‘I can also remember my father talking 
about scabs and bloody scabs and so forth all his life he spoke like that about people who did 
go back and work on the waterfront’.80 Kevin Ford remembered the way his father continued 
to fight the dispute with his strikebreaking neighbour: ‘when the scab got a TV aerial up, Dad 
went to Invercargill the next day to get a TV aerial up at our place. If the scab got something, 
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Dad got something’.81 This material emphasised the depth of feeling towards strikebreakers, 
but there is a limit to how much it can help develop our analysis. In order to fully explore 
what oral history accounts can tell us about strikebreaking, we must look for material that 
goes beyond the narrative of solidarity, and includes the more personal memories that Barron 
uncovered in 1926. 
The history of strikebreakers has also been influenced by the ferocity with which union 
members ensured strikebreakers were remembered. Alan Burge, in his article about interwar 
strikebreaking in Wales, quoted an interview from 1978: ‘If you talk about Seary… the first 
thing that springs to mind is that he was a scab. It’s a name that’s with them forever. 
BRANDED. It will be with their children. BRANDED.’82 Unions have created an absolute 
distinction line between strikebreakers and non-strikebreakers. Only those who actually 
started work on the wharf have their names put on ‘scab-lists’ or count on the government’s 
careful tally. This absolute distinction suits the purposes of those producing sources, but 
historians do not have to accept it. Jim Gibson was a seaman who was on strike in 1951 and 
in his oral history he describes the role his father played in reducing the number of 
strikebreakers in Wellington. Gibson’s sister’s husband told his father-in-law, Gibson’s father, 
that he was considering getting work on the Wellington waterfront, and Gibson’s father 
replied that his son was on strike and if the son-in-law broke the strike he would no longer be 
welcome in his house; the son-in-law did not take the work.
83
 Maureen Martin, whose 
husband was a striking freezing worker, described the web of relationships and obligations 
that shaped decision-making in her community:  
 
Well, we used to meet in Plunket rooms or out shopping and talk it 
over, say ‘who’s gone back in?’ and some would say ‘my husband 
wants to go back in’ and some would say ‘my husband would never 
go back in’. We used to discuss all that sort of thing and when they 
said they wanted to go back I would say ‘he is going to let down the 
rest of the men who have been out all this time and he’s going to let 
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himself down and his family down too.
84
 
 
Due to the government’s emergency regulations, some unusual material is located in police 
files, and narratives of decisions not to work as strikebreakers survive outside of oral histories.
 
William Price talked to his employer about going back to work on the cement works, but then 
refused to do so, citing threats from other workers. The police investigated and discovered 
quite another story. His wife had talked to a friend whose husband was also on strike and who 
said that anyone who returned to the cement works would be going back ‘as a scab’. After 
Price’s wife reported the conversation he changed his mind and refused to return to work.85 
The absolute distinction between ‘strikebreaker’ and everyone else is not helpful for 
historians; many men thought about strikebreaking and never crossed a picket line. 
The stories of Gibson, Martin and Price also demonstrate that when men were thinking 
of working as strikebreakers, his relationships with striking workers and their families could 
persuade him otherwise. Examining the relationships that persuaded workers not to take work 
on the wharves suggests another way of understanding Māori strikebreakers in a different 
way.  Rather than centring ethnicity as a deciding factor in strikebreaking, the contemporary 
discussion of Māori strikebreakers can help us explain strikebreaking more generally. 
Locked-out Māori watersiders formed a committee specifically aimed at persuading other 
Māori not to work as strikebreakers.86 Steve Watene and George Pitman travelled to marae 
around the upper North Island and spoke against strikebreaking.
87
 Aroha Harris has written 
about the importance of the connections that Māori who moved to cities maintained with their 
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homes.
88
 Pitman and Watene used the relationships they had with their own homes and also 
with other iwi and marae to persuade Māori not to work as strikebreakers. As the Auckland 
minutes recorded: First of all [Pitman]  conveyed greetings from the Maoris [sic] at 
Ngaruawahia and from Princess Te Puea.  At Maramarua there were only 3 Maoris [sic] 
employed at the open cast works and they will be knocking off.” This account emphasised 
both on-going relationships and undertakings not to work as strikebreakers.
89
 Māori workers 
in the deregistered union significantly reduced the number of Māori who were prepared to 
work on the wharves, by using relationships they had with individuals and marae to advocate 
against strikebreaking, just as Martin and Gibson had. Examining the decisions of Māori 
workers also suggests that just because those who decided not to work as strikebreakers did 
so because of their relationships, it does not follow that strikebreakers were acting as 
atomised individuals. Instead, Māori strikebreakers who talked about their decision to work 
on the wharves discussed that decision in terms of their community.
90
 Māori workers made 
up approximately a quarter of the new union; strike-breaking on the Auckland wharf was a 
rare opportunity for Māori workers to join a large workplace en masse and participate in 
shaping that workplace. At a meeting between Māori members of the new and old union, set 
up by the Waitematā tribal executive, those working on the wharf stated: ‘If they left the 
union now they thought they would only be replaced with others who might not be maoris 
[sic].’91 While, as has already been mentioned, a feature of strikebreakers is that they rarely 
discuss their motivations, the limited evidence that exists suggests that strikebreakers could 
also see their decision in terms of their relationships. 
The number of former union members who worked as strikebreakers in different ports, 
strongly suggests that contrary to the union construction of strikebreaking as an identity, the 
decision to work as a strikebreaker was contingent for many workers. In total, 821 
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watersiders were members of the new, strikebreaking, unions by 6 July 1951, about ten per 
cent of the union membership.
92
 However, the vast majority of these were from branches 
such as Port Chalmers who had voted to return to work. At branches where there was no 
collective vote to return to work, less than five per cent of workers returned to work.  No-one 
registered to work as a strikebreaker in Westport. Just seven men registered to work as 
strikebreakers in Greymouth; these men never started work as seven was considered 
insufficient to form a new union.
93
 The West Coast mining areas had a strong union history 
and culture.
94
 If anyone thought of returning to work then their friends, family members, 
people they met at Plunket, out shopping, or at the pub, would remind them not to ‘scab’. The 
difference between workers in Port Chalmers, where eighty per cent returned to work, and 
workers in Dunedin, where 3 per cent did, was not their opinion about the dispute, or their 
commitment to unionism, but that in Dunedin workers would be called ‘scabs’ by their fellow 
workers and in Port Chalmers they would not. Watersiders made decisions to become a 
strikebreaker, or not, in relationship to the workers around them.  
The complex situation in Lyttelton, further suggests that family and community 
relationships played an important role in determining who returned to work. In Lyttelton, 
there was considerable conflict among watersiders in the aftermath of the vote to return to 
work on 4 July. Those who had returned to work between 4 July and the official end of the 
dispute a week later were not quite ‘scabs’, but they did not receive a loyalty card.95 The list 
of workers who received loyalty cards from the Lyttelton branch and their addresses has 
survived.
96
 Although this list does not identify strikebreakers, and there is no comparable list 
of the pre-lockout membership to, this list can be used to deduce information about 
strikebreakers. Approximately half of those who lived outside of Lyttelton received loyalty 
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cards, while about 90 per cent of those who lived in Lyttelton received loyalty cards.
97
 Living 
in a port community made men much less willing to work as a strikebreaker.   
Strikebreaking is usually explained as either an economic decision, or a result of 
ideological opposition to the strike or lockout.
98
  There is plenty of evidence of both ideology 
and economics affecting workers decisions to work as strikebreakers in 1951.  Bassett argues 
that prior to the lock-out it was already difficult for Wellington employers to find labour and 
that this contributed to the lack of strikebreakers in Wellington.
99
 In Auckland, where there 
was higher unemployment, strikebreakers were available. The union formed the Māori 
committee out of recognition of the economic reality that many Māori workers were available 
to act as strikebreakers. As ‘Lessons of the New Zealand Waterfront Dispute’, written in 
1952, states: ‘While in the Auckland province four-fifths of Maoris [sic] still live in rural 
areas, the young people are drifting into the towns as a result of economic pressures’.100 
Ronald Belsham, the leader of the new Auckland Waterside Workers Union, had been in 
conflict with the leadership of the watersiders union, a characteristic he shared with at least 
one other worker on the Auckland waterfront.
101
  However, there was also intense economic 
hardship among workers who remained part of the dispute and plenty of conflict about how 
to fight it.
102
 At every port where a return to work vote was passed, workers returned to work 
in large numbers; there must have been workers throughout the country who wished to return 
to work, but would not do so ‘as a scab’. As Maureen Martin and Jim Gibson’s oral histories 
and William Price’s decision not to return to work demonstrate, the pressure not to work as a 
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strikebreaker was maintained not just in union meetings, but in kitchens, living rooms, shops, 
pubs and Plunket rooms. In order to work as an individual strikebreaker in a port without a 
return to work vote, workers did not just need a reason to work on the wharf, but they also 
had to ignore any relationships they had with family members, neighbours and others who 
disapproved of ‘scabs’. The biggest predictor of whether or not watersiders worked as 
strikebreakers was not their economic situation, or their beliefs, but what action workers 
around them took. 
Close study of the end of the 1951 waterfront lock-out demonstrates the importance of 
expanding our ideas of historical actors past leaders such as Holland and Barnes. On 23 July 
1951, Ray Stratton wrote to the Auckland Branch of the waterside workers union letting them 
know that he had taken other work a month earlier.
103
 His assessment that he must take other 
work was influenced by the costs he faced, but also by the realisation that he would not work 
on the wharf again, because of the number of strikebreakers. Stratton, and his comrades who 
took other work, or refused to do so, as well as those listed on the carefully assembled ‘scab 
lists’, all played an important role in the end of the 1951 waterfront dispute. Strikebreakers 
were the single biggest influence on the day to day decisions that rank and files workers made 
about the costs and risks of continuing the dispute. The events of 1951 were not a chess 
match between two teams that had control of their strategy: it was the decisions of the pawns 
on both sides that determined the result. Locked-out workers, potential strikebreakers, 
farmers with an interest in breaking the strike, were connected by webs of relationships 
which influenced the decisions they took and the outcome of the dispute.  
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